

# Incentivizing Family Savings for Child Education: Evidence from Italian Program Evaluations

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
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INSTITUTE FOR  
THE EVALUATION  
OF PUBLIC POLICIES

# Italy: Low higher attainment


Figure: Individuals with a tertiary education degree (%)



Source: OECD 2016. Individuals aged between 25 and 64. Selected countries.

# Italy: Wide social disparities in highered


**Figure:** Gap in higher education attainment between individuals with at least one higher-educated parent and those with no high-educated parents



Source: OECD 2012-2014. Individuals aged between 30 and 44. Selected countries.


# Italy: Wide social disparities in highered

Figure: 25-34 years olds holding a tertiary degree (%), by parents' education



# Italy: Historically high early school leaving (ESL)

Figure: 18-24 year olds leaving school with no upper secondary education (%)




Source: Eurostat, various years.

Education system

# Italy: Wide social disparities in ESL too

**Figure:** 18-24 year olds leaving school with no upper secondary education (%), by parents' education)



Source: ISTAT 2023.

# Inequality is not only about the ability to pay

- The direct costs of education in Italy are not very high
  - Public secondary education is free of charge
  - Public university average tuition fee: 2,000 euros a year, varies based on income
- But beyond fees, there are indirect costs and opportunity costs
- ... and family aspirations & expectations are further important mechanisms

- **Higher education**

- ✓ Means-tested grants (16% of students)
- ✓ Tuition waiver
- ✗ Underfunded
- ✗ Uncertain and unreliable
- ✗ Activated too late

- **Secondary education**

- ✓ Contribution to buy books and scholarships
- ✗ Very minimal and marginal support



# This presentation

- The potential of **matched-saving accounts programs** as a financial aid tool to improve low-income youths' education participation
- Case study #1: Percorsi, post-secondary education, Turin
  - 👉 **ACHAB** RCT (N=716)
  - 👉 **HOMER** Follow-up RCT (N=1,475)
- Case study #2: WILL - Educare al Futuro, secondary education, Turin, Florence, South Sardinia, Teramo
  - 👉 **WILL** RCT (N=576)

# Outline

## 1 Background

## 2 #1 Percorsi

## 3 #2 WILL


## 4 Conclusions

# Matched Savings Programs


- **Individual Development Accounts** (Sherraden 1991) → provide low-income families with an incentivized savings account to help them invest in **long-term assets** (e.g. home ownership, microenterprise, or **education**)
  - Implemented in the US, Singapore, Canada and the UK (Beverly et al. 2013), as well as in other developing countries (Cornell 2003)
- **Children's Savings Accounts** (Elliott & Lewis 2018) → targeted to children's post-secondary education:
  - Start early (also at birth)
  - Often include matches and/or progressive incentives (e.g., initial seed)

# Children's Savings Accounts (CSAs)

Figure: Number (thousands) of children with a CSA, US (2016-2023)



# Pathways from CSA programs to college success



Source: Beverly et al. 2013

# Existing evidence on CSAs

Experimental evidence (Emrey-Arras 2020, Elliott 2024):

- ↑ Savings for college (Beverly et al 2016; Long & Bettinger 2017)
  - ↑ Child social emotional development (Huang et al. 2014)
  - ↑ Parents' educational expectations (Kim et al 2015)
  - ? Post-secondary education access and attainment (Long & Bettinger 2017)
- No studies on programs addressing secondary education

# Outline

- 1 Background
- 2 #1 Percorsi
  - Part A - ACHAB
  - Part B - HOMER
- 3 #2 WILL
- 4 Conclusions

# The program: *Percorsi*

- Implemented by a Foundation (*Ufficio Pio - Compagnia di San Paolo*) in Torino (NW Italy) since 2010
- Eligible students are:
  - ✓ enrolled in the **last two years of high school** (12th and 13th grades)
  - ✓ come from **low/medium-income households** (ISEE- 25k euro, 150% of poverty level for 4 pers. households)
  - ✓ **reside** in the metropolitan area of Torino



# The program: how it works

1) The eligible student/family signs up



2) The student saves monthly min 5€ - max 50€ (no initial seed)



3) The program matches the savings with a given multiplier (2:1 for high school or **4:1 for university**)



4) The student can spend the matched savings (max 8,000€) for allowed education-related expenses



Saving period (max 6 years)

In addition, students and their families attend financial education classes


Part A

**A**ffording **C**ollege with the **H**elp of **A**sset **B**uilding (ACHAB)



Martini et al. 2021

# Experiment flowchart




# Implementation

Take-up statistics and program's services usage	Value
Opened the savings account	100%
Made at least one deposit	94%
Average (median) monthly deposit <sup>a</sup>	33 (36) euros
Average (median) total deposit <sup>a</sup>	1,088 (1,050) euros
Average (median) matched grants (estimate)	4,810 (5,696) euros
Euros spent with the 2:1 match rate as a percentage of total money spent	5.7%
<i>Expenditures breakdown</i>	
Tuition fees	33%
PC/internet	28%
Transportation	16%
Books	9%
Other	14%
<i>Financial education participation</i>	
Attended at least one module	96%
Average (median) number of modules attended	2.2 (2)

# Integrity & estimation


- Statistical equivalence of the randomized groups (t-tests) ✓
- Overall attrition (4.7 - 7.4%) ✓
- Differential attrition (1.7-3.4 pp) ✓
- **Intent-To-Treat (ITT)** estimated through **OLS regressions** to improve precision

# Experimental impact estimates




# Experimental impact estimates

Enrollment



Persistence to the second year




Control Treatment

# Regressivity?

No heterogeneous effects across income groups


... but lower-income families save less than richer families (29 vs 37 euros a month)





# Regressivity?

... lower-income families also receive fewer matched funds



## Part A Conclusions

- Findings:
  - Substantial impacts on university enrollment and persistence
  - Largest impacts for vocational schools and children of low-educated parents
  - Regressivity in financial mechanism design
- Open questions:
  - Do the findings repeat?
  - College completion?
  - Labor market outcomes?

Part B  
How to Make COLlege MorE AffoRdable (**HOMER**)



A follow-up study to investigate college completion and work during and after college (**W.I.P.**)

# Research questions

How does the program affect ...

- ① ... college completion?
- ② ... labor market participation during college years?
- ③ ... labor market participation after college years?

# Research design

- We match two sources of admin data
  - Piemonte Universities archive
  - Comunicazioni Obbligatorie (COB)
- Sample
  - ACHAB sample (N=716)
  - + three additional cohorts (N= ca. 700) of applicants who followed the same randomization protocol in subsequent years
- Timeline

# Research questions

How does the program affect ...

① ... college completion?

② ... **labor market participation during college years?**

E.g. *Do treated students choose university instead of work? Does the program help students minimize the time students spend working (time allocation)?*

③ ... labor market participation after college years?

# A first exploration of Treatment/Control differences

- Data: COB data + survey data first three cohorts (ACHAB sample)
- Outcome: subject's condition in 1st year after HS (July Y1 - June Y2):
  - 1 NEET (not enrolled at uni, never worked);
  - 2 Worker (not enrolled, has worked);
  - 3 Student (enrolled, worked less than 3 months);
  - 4 Working student (enrolled, worked more than 3 months);
  - 5 Missing (no info)

# Youths' condition in the first year after HS graduation

Table: Youths' condition in the 1st year after HS graduation (%)

Condition	Control	Treatment	Difference
NEET	15.9	14.9	-1.1
Worker	15.2	9.0	-6.2
Student	59.0	67.1	+8.1
Working student	4.5	6.6	+2.1
Missing	5.4	2.4	-3.0
N	427	289	



# By school track

Table: Youths' condition in the 1st year after HS graduation (%)

Condition	Licei			Technical			Vocational		
	C	T	Diff	C	T	Diff	C	T	Diff
NEET	14.9	9.4	-5.6	14.4	19.2	+4.9	22.7	21.7	-1.0
Worker	6.3	4.3	-1.9	22.2	13.5	-8.8	27.3	13.0	-14.2
Student	71.6	78.4	+6.8	52.3	58.7	+6.4	34.9	52.2	+17.3
Working student	1.9	5.8	+3.8	7.8	5.8	-2.1	4.6	10.9	+6.3
Missing	5.3	2.2	-3.1	3.3	2.9	-0.4	10.6	2.2	-8.4
N	208	139		153	104		66	46	

## Part B - Conclusions

- Preliminary findings:
  - Positive effect on being 'full-time' student
  - Different 'counterfactuals' for vocational and general school students
- Next
  - linking COB & UNI data all cohorts (joint work w/ ASVAPP) in 2025

# will

educare al futuro




Co-financed by: Impresa Sociale Con i Bambini, Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino) e Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze. Partners: Un Sogno per Tutti Cooperativa Sociale; Associazione Vides Main onlus; Caritas Teramo Atri; Consorzio solidarieta' aprutina societa' cooperative; Cooperativa Sociale le Api; Diaconia Valdese; Fondazione Solidarieta' Caritas onlus; Il Mio Mondo Societa' Cooperativa Sociale; Il Nostro Pianeta; Ufficio Pio Della Compagnia di San Paolo.


# The program

- Goal: Raising low-income students' high school (HS) completion
- Saving account:
  - Saving from 1 to 6 euros weekly, for four years (max 1,000 euros)
  - 4:1 match rate
  - Matched money (max 4,000 + 1,000 saved) for allowed education-related expenses (e.g. fees, transportation, computer, internet, extra-school activities, etc.)
- Other student services: financial education/assistance; educational support & guidance
- Target: 6th grade students from low-income families (N=576)
- Timeline: Between 2019 and 2024
- Sites: Turin, Florence, South Sardinia and Teramo

# WILL RCT design




# WILL - Logical framework



# Savings (implementation data)

- 94% made at least one deposit
- Average savings: 718 euros
- Families with higher income save more



# Savings behavior and attitudes, 20 months

After 20 months:

- Percentage of families saving up by 25%
- No side effects on material hardship


	(1) Has saved last 12 mo.	(2) N material hardships (0-9)	(3) Saving for children is important
Control mean	0.458	2.122	0.981
ITT	<b>0.117**</b> <b>[0.026,0.209]</b>	<b>-0.014</b> <b>[-0.391,0.362]</b>	0.008 [-0.014,0.031]
N	449	448	429

Note: 95% C.I. in brackets. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .




# Expenditures (implementation data)

- 87% made at least one purchase
- Average expenditure: 3,080 euros, significant differences based on income



# Expenditures (implementation data)

- 87% made at least one purchase
- Average expenditure: 3,080 euros, significant differences based on income
- High incidence of digital technologies (COVID), sports, and books



# Edtech availability during Covid and extra school activities

## Edtech availability during Covid

After 20 months, Spring 21

- 44% more students have a dedicated PC/tablet
- 28% more families have a fast internet connection

	Edtech COVID		Extra-school Sport activities
	Has own PC/tablet	High speed internet	
Control mean	0.430	0.313	.59
ITT	<b>0.192***</b> [0.101,0.282]	<b>0.089**</b> [0.001,0.176]	<b>.099**</b> [0.011,0.187]
N	456	448	440

## Extra-school activities


After 36 months, Fall 22

- 17% more students do sport
- No effects on other activities

Note: 95% C.I. in brackets. \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.


# Educational aspirations and expectations

- On average, no effect on parents or children's aspirations and expectations
- But strong positive effects on lower-income parents
- No effects on parent's level of involvement in children's education




# Educational performance

- No effect on average middle school grade, but strong positive effect among low incomes




# Educational performance

- No effect on average middle school grade, but strong positive effect among low incomes
- Reduction of irregular school attendance (skipping school/some lessons, arriving late to school)




# Educational performance

- No effect on average middle school grade, but strong positive effect among low incomes
- Reduction of irregular school attendance (skipping school/some lessons, arriving late to school)
- No effect on school track choice



# Summary of findings





## Other ongoing impact evaluations

Matched savings account programs for secondary education:

- **WILL-TO** (2021-2026)
  - 1,140 children in Turin
  - Funding: Ufficio Pio
- **PUOI** (2023-2028)
  - About 100 children in the province of Cuneo
  - Funding: Conibambini

## Concluding remarks

- Italy's has record-high levels of inequality in education participation
- The existing financial aid policy needs substantial improvement
- Matched savings programs show promise
- Evaluation evidence being collected from several programs
- Open questions:
  - ? Scalability
  - ? Progressivity in the financial mechanism
  - ? Channels and mechanisms
  - ? Effects on financial literacy & future orientation

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## Appendix

# Italian education system

Grade					Age
	Master Degree (Laurea Magistrale) ISCED 5A				22
	Bachelor degree (Laurea) ISCED 5A				21
					20
					19
13			Technical Schools (Istituti tecnici) ISCED 3a/3b	General schools (Licei) ISCED 3a/3b	18
12					17
11	Regional vocational training courses ISCED 3b/3c	Vocational schools (Istituti professionali) ISCED 3a/3b			16
10					15
9					14
8	Lower secondary school (Scuola secondaria di primo livello) ISCED 2a				13
7					12
6					11
5					10
4	Primary school (Scuola primaria) ISCED 1				9
3					8
2					7
1					6
	Pre-school (Scuola d'infanzia) ISCED 0				5
					4
					3

Table: Data collection

Call	Cohort	Grade	Baseline	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
1 (2014/2015)	1	13	Fall 2014	Spring 2016	Fall 2016	Fall 2017
1 (2014/2015)	2	12	Fall 2014	Spring 2017	Fall 2017	
2 (2015/2016)	3	13	Fall 2015	Spring 2017	Fall 2017	

- **Baseline survey** (application form): information on socio-demographic characteristics, enrollment intentions and school career.
- **Wave 1:** enrollment decision and persistence indicators such as (drop-out and number of exams) after one semester;
- **Wave 2:** persistence indicators such as (drop-out and number of exams) after one year and second-year enrollment;
- **Wave 3:** persistence indicators such as (drop-out and number of exams) after two years and third-year enrollment.

# ACHAB - Group equivalence (cont)

Table: Balancing test: group averages and t-test

	Control Group Mean	Treatment Group Mean	P-Value T-Test
Female	0.541	0.597	0.138
ISEE	9567.18	9905.04	0.57
Social class			
Service and white collars	0.373	0.353	0.598
Self-employed	0.135	0.14	0.836
Working class	0.493	0.507	0.714
Parental education			
Up to lower secondary degree	0.399	0.437	0.314
Upper secondary degree	0.462	0.447	0.694
Tertiary degree	0.139	0.117	0.372
Migration background			
Native	0.791	0.8	0.766
Mixed parents	0.063	0.04	0.186
Both parents migrants	0.147	0.16	0.624
Household size (>5)	0.106	0.103	0.917

# ACHAB - Group equivalence

Table: Balancing test: group averages and t-test


	Control Group Mean	Treatment Group Mean	P-Value T-Test
Low. Sec. Grade			
Excellent	0.291	0.21	0.015
Very good	0.252	0.287	0.307
Good	0.317	0.4	0.022
Sufficient	0.139	0.103	0.149
No Remedial exam	0.536	0.527	0.804
No Failure	0.772	0.813	0.178
Aims to enroll in University	0.502	0.507	0.911
N	416	300	716



Table: Response rates by cohort and group

	Cohort 1		Cohort 2		Cohort 3	
	Treated	Controls	Treated	Controls	Treated	Controls
<b>Baseline</b>	103	153	97	145	89	129
<b>Wave I</b>						
Respondents	101	147	95	135	86	122
Response rate	98.1%	96.1%	97.9%	93.1%	96.6%	94.6%
<b>Wave II</b>						
Respondents	96	142	90	130	84	121
Response rate	93.2%	92.8%	92.8%	89.7%	94.4%	93.8%
<b>Wave III</b>						
Respondents	88	124	-	-	-	-
Response rate	85.4%	81.0%				

# ACHAB - Attrition



Source: What Works Clearinghouse

(1) *How many students does the program need to support in order to induce an additional one to enroll at a university?*

$$\text{Cost-effectiveness}_j = \frac{\text{Deadweight}_j}{\text{Impact}_j} \quad (1)$$

(2) *How much would it cost to induce an additional one to enroll at a university?*

Cost-effectiveness I X average cost

# ACHAB - Cost-effectiveness (2)

Table: Cost-effectiveness, overall and by track

<i>First Year Enrollment</i>	Overall	Academic	Technical	Vocational
Deadweight (a)	.671	.777	.622	.441
Impact (b)	.087	.091	.047	.205
<b>Cost-effectiveness I (<math>c=a/b</math>)</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Average cost (d)	4,811	5,733	4,292	3,243
<b>Cost-effectiveness II (<math>e=c \times d</math>)</b>	<b>37,104</b>	<b>48,955</b>	<b>56,794</b>	<b>6,977</b>

→ Percorsi outperforms the median program included in Herbaut & Geven (2020) review of financial aid programs evaluations (Cost-effectiveness I=17.2).

# HOMER - Timeline

Cohorts		2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019		2020		2021		2022		2023		2024		2025	
Sch. Year	Grade	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec	jan-june	jul-dec
'14-'15	13		A&R			FUS1	FUS2													COB	COB			UNI	COB
'14-'15	12		A&R					FUS1	FUS2											COB	COB			UNI	COB
'15-'16	13				A&R			FUS1	FUS2											COB	COB			UNI	COB
'15-'16	12				A&R															COB	COB			UNI	COB
'16-'17	13						A&R													COB	COB			UNI	COB
'16-'17	12						A&R													COB	COB			UNI	COB

## Legend

high school - grades <12

high school - grade 12

high school - grade 13

college - bachelor (3-yrs)

college - master (3+2 yrs)

college - single cycle (6 yrs)

A&R Application and Randomization

FUS1,2,3 Followup Survey 1,2,3 ACHAB

COB Comunicazioni Obbligatorie HOMER

UNI University archive HOMER

back

Table: Pros and Cons of the COB data

Pros	Cons
All subordinate employment relations, starts/extensions/ interruptions, full/part-time, industry sector	No information on self-employment, informal work, nor wages
All individuals residing in Piemonte or hired by a company located in Piemonte	24% not matched (though 8 out 10 are students, hence about 4% could be either NEET or working out of the region)

# HOMER - Employment Statistics

Table: Employment Types

Employment Type	Count	Percentage (%)
Apprenticeship	273	8.21
Subordinate contract	218	6.56
Internship	326	9.80
Fixed-term contract	1,053	31.67
Temporary agency work	970	29.17
Other	389	11.70
Permanent contract	96	2.89
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,325</b>	<b>100.00</b>